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Kramer: Bail Reform

NOTE
Bail Reform: A Possible Solution to
Missouri’s Broken Public Defender System?
Dana Kramer*

I. INTRODUCTION
Bail reform is currently sweeping through the United States. Over forty
jurisdictions have implemented new bail systems based on empirical data that
aim to assist judges in determining bail and to reduce the use of cash bail.1
Missouri, following the lead of many other states, has introduced new court
rules from the state’s Supreme Court that embrace this bail reform
movement.2 The state’s bail reform intersects with the issues facing the
Missouri Public Defender System (the “MSPD”). The MSPD suffers from
excessive caseloads and gross underfunding, both of which significantly
undermine public defenders’ ability to provide effective counsel to indigent
defendants.3 Because indigent defendants are the class of persons most
affected by the current bail system, the bail reform movement is largely meant
to impact them.
Bail reform in several jurisdictions is not producing these intended
effects and is instead posing many risks to indigent defendants’ pretrial
procedural and constitutional rights. This Note considers the bail reform in
Missouri, which took effect in 2019, as well as its implications on Missouri
public defenders and the indigent defendants they represent. To do so, Part II
first relates the constitutional protections afforded to indigent defendants and
examines the problematic history of the MSPD. Part III delves into recent
attempts in Missouri to remedy the MSPD’s problems, including the state’s
proposed bail reform, and compares bail reform in Missouri with other states
who have also adopted new bail systems. This Note then concludes, in Part
* B.S., Culver-Stockton College, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2020. Thank you to Professor Rodney Uphoff for sharing your expertise and
passion for this topic with me and thank you to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law
Review for their helpful insight during the editing process.
1. See Meghan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 303, 345 (2017).
2. See infra Section III.C.
3. See, e.g., Chris Dandurand, Note, Walking Out on the Check: How Missouri
Abandoned Its Public Defenders and Left the Poor to Foot the Bill, 76 MO. L. REV.
185 (2011).
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IV, with a discussion of the consequences of the new bail system and offers
suggestions to improve Missouri’s bail reform.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A criminal defendant’s right to counsel is constitutionally rooted in the
Sixth Amendment: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”4 The Missouri
Constitution contains a similar right in its Bill of Rights: “That in criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person
and by counsel . . . .”5 This right ensures that indigent defendants –
defendants who cannot afford an attorney – receive representation in their
criminal case.6 This Part provides background on the development of this
right. Section A details the rights afforded to indigent criminal defendants
under the Sixth Amendment, and Section B focuses on attempts in Missouri
to provide this right to indigent defendants.

A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright
interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to extend to persons
charged with a felony.7 Gideon involved an indigent defendant in Florida who
was convicted of a felony and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration.8 A
Florida state court denied the defendant appointment of a public defender
because Florida law at the time only allowed the court to appoint a public
defender in capital cases.9 Stating that “any person hailed into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him,” the Supreme Court distinguished the right to counsel as
“fundamental and essential in fair trials.”10 The Supreme Court concluded
that indigent persons charged with felonies have a constitutional right to
counsel.11 The Supreme Court further held that this right is applied to all
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.12
However, Gideon only addressed the right to counsel in felony cases.13
The Supreme Court did not extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
misdemeanor cases until 1972.14 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, a defendant
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
Id. at 345.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
See Argersinger v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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charged with a misdemeanor offense and sentenced to ninety days in jail
alleged that he was deprived of his right to counsel as an indigent defendant.15
The Supreme Court considered the historical roots of the Sixth Amendment,
noting that twelve of the thirteen colonies recognized the right to counsel in
all criminal cases, including petty offenses.16 The Supreme Court then
discussed and applied the rationale of Gideon, reasoning that the legal and
constitutional questions presented in misdemeanor cases are no less complex
merely because the person charged may be imprisoned for six months or
less.17 Therefore, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to
misdemeanor and petty offense prosecutions where the defendant faces the
possibility of incarceration.18
The Supreme Court held in Rothgery v. Gillespie County that the right
to counsel attaches when “formal judicial proceedings have begun,” or, in
other words, when a criminal defendant first appears before a judge and learns
of the charges against him.19 As a result of Rothgery and Argersinger, many
states, such as Wisconsin, require attorneys to represent criminal defendants
when the defendant first appears in court and bail is set.20 In some states,
however, defendants do not appear with counsel at their initial appearance,
meaning that these defendants may not be appointed counsel for weeks or
months.21
The Supreme Court further specified the right to counsel in McMann v.
Richardson as entitlement to effective counsel.22 The Missouri Supreme
Court, in 2012, likewise followed the holding that “the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is a right to effective and competent counsel,”23 which
“requires counsel to appropriately investigate, prepare, and present [a] client’s
case.”24
The United States Supreme Court has declined to specify what effective
counsel entails.25 However, the American Bar Association (the “ABA”)
published the Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function

15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 31–33.
18. Id. at 36–37.
19. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211, 213 (2008).
20. See WIS. STAT. § 970.01 (2018); see also DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d
1019, 1031 (Md. 2013) (“[W]e hold that . . . an indigent defendant is entitled to statefurnished counsel at an initial hearing . . . .”).
21. See Douglas Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1782 (2002).
22. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
23. State ex rel. Mo. Public Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Mo.
2012) (en banc).
24. Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 249 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“More specific
guidelines are not appropriate . . . . The proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”).
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(“Standards”) to “provide guidance for the professional conduct and
performance of defense counsel.”26 These Standards include:
a duty of confidentiality . . . a duty of communicating and informing
the client . . . a duty of carrying an appropriate workload that will not
interfere with providing qualify representation . . . a duty of
establishing a relationship with the client and maintaining that
relationship . . . a duty of investigating in all cases . . . a duty of
preparing for court proceedings in advance . . . [and] a duty of
considering and relating to the client consequences that may arise from
a charge, plea, or conviction and the effects of this on sentencing.27

Missouri State Public Defender Guidelines for Representation,
principally tracking the Standards language, specifically state the
responsibilities of Missouri public defenders.28 Additionally, the Missouri
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe that attorneys act
with “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client” and keep
clients reasonably informed about their case.29
Though effective counsel is a constitutional right to which every
criminal defendant facing incarceration is entitled and the ABA provides
guidelines on how to meet this responsibility, many criminal defendants
across the United States, and particularly in Missouri, do not receive effective
counsel from state public defenders.30 Inadequate funding for public defender
systems and increasing caseloads undermine an indigent defendant’s doctrinal
right to effective counsel.31 The MSPD has been one of the most
dysfunctional public defender systems in the United States for the past few
decades.32

B. Missouri’s Public Defender System
In the aftermath of Gideon, Missouri courts appointed attorneys to
represent indigent defendants without pay.33 However, the Missouri Supreme
26. Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function- Standard 4-1.1(a), AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Apr.
16,
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFo
urthEdition/ [perma.cc/LA28-RK45].
27. Id. (discussing Standards 4-5.4 and 4-8.3).
28. See Expert Report of Rodney J. Uphoff at 4–5, Church v. Missouri, 268 F.
Supp. 3d 992, 996–97 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 17-04057-CV-C-NKL), 2017 WL
9857219.
29. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3, 4-1.4.
30. See Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 667, 669–70 (2010).
31. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734
(2005).
32. Uphoff, Foreward, supra note 30, at 670.
33. See State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
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Court soon held in State v. Green that the responsibility of representing
indigent defendants was not the duty of Missouri attorneys but was
constitutionally “the burden of the State.”34 In 1972, the state legislature
responded to Green with the enactment of Chapter 600 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes.35 Chapter 600 created the MSPD and the Public Defender
Commission (the “PDC”), which governs the entire MSPD and establishes
criteria for indigency.36 This new legislation created a dual system for
handling indigent cases, which consisted of fourteen local public defender
offices and appointed counsel programs where private attorneys would
contract with the State to represent indigent defendants at a set fee.37
However, the MSPD soon faced issues of underfunding, as the amount
appropriated to the MSPD remained stagnant while caseloads increased
dramatically.38 In fiscal year 1980, less than ten years after the MSPD’s
inception, the MSPD ran out of funds nearly two months before the fiscal year
ended.39 As a result, local public defender offices were grossly underfunded
and contracted attorneys were not paid for their work.40
The Missouri Supreme Court was soon called upon to compel the
General Assembly to pay attorneys for their work in State ex rel. Wolff v.
Ruddy.41 Reluctant to violate the separation of powers, the court concluded
that it could not force the legislature to provide more funds to the MSPD.42
However, the court found that it could require members of the Missouri Bar
to provide representation.43 The court’s decision left Missouri attorneys to
continue representing indigent defendants despite a gross lack of funding and
the possibility of never receiving compensation.44
The Missouri legislature responded to Ruddy in 1982 with the creation
of the Office of the State Public Defender (the “OSPD”), a department
34. Id. (citing State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 446 (N.J. 1966)).
35. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.011 (2018).
36. See State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
(per curiam); MO. REV. STAT. ch. 600 (2018). MO. REV. STAT. § 600.086 (2018)
(defining indigency as: “[a] person shall be considered eligible for representation . . .
when it appears from all the circumstances of the case including his ability to make
bond, his income and the number of persons dependent on him for support that the
person does not have the means at his disposal or available to him to obtain counsel
in his behalf . . . .”).
37. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
38. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N 5, 9,
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/MSPD-2018-AnnualReport-Print-Copy-Color-10172018.pdf [perma.cc/BA83-AUKD].
39. State ex rel. Wolff, 617 S.W.2d at 65.
40. Id. at 66.
41. Id. at 64.
42. Id. at 65.
43. Id. Attorneys must be a member of the Missouri Bar to practice in the state
of Missouri. Id.
44. Id. at 66–67.
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independent of the judicial branch that was authorized to set guidelines for
determining indigency.45 The OSPD could also appoint private counsel to
represent indigent defendants.46 But finding private attorneys willing to
represent indigent defendants became increasingly difficult, spurring
reorganization of the MSPD.47 The MSPD was restructured into three
specialized divisions: the Capital Division, the Appellate/Post-Conviction
Relief Division, and the Trial Division.48 Today, the MSPD consists of thirtythree district offices, six appellate sections, and three capital sections.49
Private attorneys are still contracted to handle indigent cases, with
approximately thirteen percent of the MSPD’s caseload being contracted to
the private bar in 2018.50
However, these legislative actions proved ineffectual and funding
remained excessively low.51 A 2009 study conducted by the Spangenberg
Group found that Missouri had “the lowest per-capita expenditures of all
states, except for Mississippi,”52 and in 2013, the National Juvenile Defense
Center found Missouri’s indigent defense system to be “in crisis” as a result
of the many years of immense caseloads and insufficient resources.53 In 2018,
the MSPD disposed of over 70,000 cases with only 384 full-time attorneys
employed.54
The immense pressure of high caseloads, inadequate resources, and low
salaries resulted in 15.5% of attorneys leaving the MSPD in 2018.55 The
MSPD’s 2018 annual report credits the high turnover rate to staggering

45. Our Distinguished History, MO. STATE PUB. DEF. (2017),
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/history-of-mspd/
[perma.cc/XL4CXYMT]. The OSPD was under the control of the Public Defender Commission. Id.
46. Id.
47. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
48. Our Distinguished History, supra note 44. The Capital Division handles first
degree murder cases in which the state is seeking the death penalty and juvenile firstdegree murder cases with the possibility of life without parole. Fiscal Year 2018
Annual Report, supra note 38. The Appellate/Post Conviction Relief Division handles
appeals and post-conviction relief cases. Id. at 53. The Trial Division handles felonies,
misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and probation violations. Id. at 16.
49. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 1.
50. Id. at 63.
51. Press Release, Mo. State Pub. Defender, Public Defender Commission
Adopts Rule to Limit Availability of Overloaded Offices to Take on More Cases (Nov.
2, 2007).
52. Id.
53. Mary Ann Scali et al., Missouri: Justice Rationed; An Assessment of Access
to Counsel and Quality of Juvenile Defense Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings,
THE
NAT’L
JUV.
DEFENSE
CTR.
7,
33
(2013),
http://njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Missouri-Justice-Rationed-Assessment-ofAccess-to-Counsel-NJDC-2013.pdf [perma.cc/HG5U-MHAH].
54. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 13–14.
55. Id. at 7.
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student debt and overwhelming caseloads.56 The high turnover leaves few
experienced attorneys at the MSPD, resulting in new, inexperienced attorneys
handling serious felony cases.57 The turnover rate affects supervision within
the MSPD, as supervisors are expected to handle their own caseloads in
addition to reassigning cases to remaining attorneys and hiring and training
new attorneys.58
The turnover rate combined with excessive caseloads lowers the quality
of representation provided to indigent defendants.59 When public defenders
handle hundreds of cases alone, the amount of time devoted to each indigent
defendant decreases drastically, often resulting in public defenders being
underprepared or not prepared at all for trial.60 The turnover rates can also
result in indigent defendants being appointed multiple different public
defenders throughout their case, meaning that each newly appointed public
defender must meet the client and orient themselves with the case.61
Recognizing the issues with the MSPD, the Missouri Senate created an
Interim Committee to review the MSPD system in 2007.62 The Committee’s
report recommended that caseloads be reduced, staff numbers increased, base
salaries increased, and funding added “through supplanting unconstitutional
court costs and providing additional appropriations.”63 The PDC’s annual
report that year similarly found that the high caseload was overwhelming to
the point that public defenders would have to start declining new cases.64
In 2009, the Missouri Senate responded and introduced Senate Bill 37,
which would have set “caseload maximums and contract[ed] with private
attorneys to handle cases exceeding those maximums.”65 Though the Bill
passed with ease through both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
then-Governor Jay Nixon vetoed the bill.66
With Governor Nixon’s heavy hand on the veto, the MSPD turned to the
courts for relief.67 The PDC adopted 18 C.S.R. Section 10-4.010, which
created a procedure that allowed public defenders to refuse new cases.68

56. Id.
57. See Uphoff, supra note 28, at 12.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 12–13; see generally Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One
Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-caseloads.html?searchResultPosition=1 [perma.cc/Z7Q6-SQ4Q].
60. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 13–14.
61. Id. at 27.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 15.
68. 18 C.S.R. 10-4.010 (2009); Uphoff, supra note 28, at 15. Section 10-4.010
“authorized the MSPD director to declare an office of limited availability when its
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Section 10-4.010 allows the public defender’s office to select “categories of
cases to be designated for exclusion from public defender representation once
the district is certified . . . as of limited availability.”69
In State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Pratte, the
public defender’s office in Boone County, Missouri, after being designated as
of limited availability, notified the circuit court that it would not accept any
new probation violation cases where a suspended execution of sentence had
been imposed.70 A public defender attempted to utilize this policy and filed a
notice with the court that the public defender’s office was unavailable to
represent an indigent defendant whose probation was suspended.71 Despite
this, the judge appointed the public defender to the case.72
As a result, the PDC, the Director of the MSPD, and the appointed public
defender filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.73 The Missouri Supreme
Court held that Section 10.4-010 denied an indigent defendant the right to
representation.74 The court further posited that the PDC could not
categorically reject a certain class of cases, finding that refusing to accept
probation violation cases contradicted the PDC’s obligation to represent all
indigent defendants: “Indigent defendants who are accused of violating their
probation have the same Sixth Amendment right to counsel as all other
indigent defendants who face the possibility of imprisonment.”75 The court
then offered suggestions on how to “reduce the demand for public defender
services,” recommending that prosecutors agree to limit the number of cases
where the state seeks incarceration and that judges withhold from appointing
counsel in certain cases.76
After Pratte, the MSPD continued to rely on Section 10-4.010 to manage
its caseload.77 However, in 2012, the same issue in Pratte appeared again
before the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender
Commission v. Waters.78 In Waters, the Director of the MSPD certified a
district defender’s office as of limited availability pursuant to Section 10caseload became excessive,” which was determined on “an office exceeding the
maximum caseload standard for a period of three consecutive months.” Uphoff, supra
note 28, at 15 (quoting 18 C.S.R. 10.4.010 (2009)) (Subsection 18 CSR 204.010(2)(E) voided by State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870
(Mo. 2009) (en banc))).
69. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 884 (2009)
(quoting 18 C.S.R. 10-4.010). Certification of limited availability allowed a public
defender’s office to decline to take new cases. Id.
70. Id. at 883.
71. Id. at 884.
72. Id. at 883–84.
73. Id. at 881, 884–85.
74. Id. at 883.
75. Id. at 885.
76. Id. at 887.
77. See Uphoff, supra note 28, at 17.
78. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (2012)
(en banc).
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4.010.79 Despite this, and over objection, a judge appointed a public defender
to represent the defendant.80 The MSPD moved to set aside the appointment
because it violated Section 10-4.010.81 The Missouri Supreme Court
reiterated its holding from Pratte that regardless of the resources available for
the defense of an indigent defendant, a judge must ensure that such defendant
receives effective counsel.82
Governor Nixon again impeded repair of the MSPD in 2015 when he
withheld almost three million dollars from the MSPD.83 Frustrated with
Governor Nixon’s actions, Michael Barrett, the Director of the MSPD,
appointed Governor Nixon, who had an active law license, to represent an
indigent defendant.84 Barrett relied on Section 600.042.5 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes, which grants the director of the MSPD the power to
“delegate the legal representation of an eligible person to any member of the
state bar of Missouri,” to appoint Governor Nixon.85 A Missouri court,
however, disallowed the appointment on the basis that courts have the sole
power to appoint counsel.86 Though unsuccessful, Barrett’s attempted
appointment made national headlines and brought further attention to the
ongoing struggles of the MSPD.87

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Missouri’s efforts to address the crisis facing the MSPD have thus far
been ineffective.88 Recently, however, new avenues have been proposed to
remedy this. One such attempt involves a group of criminal defendants who
brought a class action asking the judiciary to compel the legislature to
adequately fund the MSPD.89 Alternatively, new court rules that seek to

79. Id. at 600–01.
80. Id. at 601.
81. Id. at 602.
82. Id. at 606 (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d
870, 875 (2009) (en banc)).
83. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 9. Governor Greitens also
withheld funds in the amount of $3.5 million from the MPSD in 2017. Id.
84. Celeste Bott, Court Rules Public Defender Can’t Appoint Missouri Governor
as a Defense Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/ local/govt-and-politics/court-rules-public-defendercan-t-appoint-missouri-governor-as/article_c59059f8-98c8-50fe-906812a9b092b7f3.html [perma.cc/L3YH-PQBB].
85. Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public Defender, THE
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
4,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/when-the-governor-is-yourlawyer/494453/ [perma.cc/G3AK-6SR2]; MO. REV. STAT. § 600.042.5 (2018).
86. Bott, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. See supra Part II.
89. See Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019).
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modify traditional judicial discretion took effect recently in Missouri.90 This
Part begins with a discussion of Church v. Missouri, followed by a discussion
of a national bail reform movement and Missouri’s bail reform.

A. Church v. Missouri
In 2017, a group of Missouri criminal defendants attempted a different
approach at a potential judicial remedy.91 The defendants brought a putative
class action to challenge the adequacy of the MSPD.92 In Church v. Missouri,
the plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights under both the
United States and Missouri Constitutions and sought prospective relief for
both themselves and other defendants in Missouri “who are eligible to be
represented by the MSPD.”93 The plaintiffs named the State of Missouri and
then-Governor Eric Greitens as defendants (“Defendants”).94
The named plaintiffs of the class (“Plaintiffs”) each experienced
frustrations with the MSPD.95 Plaintiff Shondell Church, arrested and
charged in 2016 for felony theft, did not meet his appointed public defender
until he had spent over forty days in jail and was not informed of a subsequent
change in his legal representation during the course of his case when his
originally appointed attorney left the MSPD.96 Plaintiff Randall Lee Dalton,
having physical and mental disabilities, could not access his medication while
incarcerated and did not appear before a tribunal until almost two months after
his arrest because Dalton’s appointed public defender waived Dalton’s
appearance and reset his case without Dalton’s knowledge.97 Plaintiff Dorian
Samuels, facing a thirty-year sentence for assault, had a total of three public
defenders appointed to him during the course of his case.98 Samuels’ third
public defender wrote Samuels to inform him of the probable forthcoming
inadequate representation due to the attorney’s overwhelming caseload.99
Plaintiff Viola Bowman’s public defender continued her trial at least ten times
due to his obligations in other cases and managerial duties, resulting in
Bowman’s pretrial incarceration for over 800 days.100 Plaintiff Brian
Richman, as a result of his public defender waiving his right to appear at
90. See H.R. 666, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).
91. See Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 996–97 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d
913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019).
92. Id. at 997.
93. Id. at 1008.
94. Id. Governor Greitens resigned as governor while this case was pending
appeal. Id. at 754 n.1. Per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), his successor,
Michael Parson, was automatically substituted as a defendant. Id.
95. Id. at 1002–07.
96. Id. at 1002–03.
97. Id. at 1004.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1006.
100. Id. at 1007.
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hearings without first obtaining his consent, began writing letters directly to
the judge to advocate on his own behalf.101
Of the five named plaintiffs, none had counsel present with them when
bail was set.102 Randell was held on bond despite not seeing a judge or an
attorney.103 Though Plaintiffs could not afford the bail that had been set, none
of their public defenders advocated for a reduction of bail amount.104
Moreover, the public defenders failed to conduct any investigation or pretrial
motion practice on behalf of their clients.105
Plaintiffs filed expert reports from Professors Robert Boruchowitz and
Rodney Uphoff.106 In his report, Professor Boruchowitz concluded that
Plaintiffs “[were] constructively denied counsel in violation of the 6th
Amendment” due to various structural and systemic problems, including
inadequate funding, enormous caseloads, insufficient training and attorneyclient communications, and “a disparity of resources between prosecution and
defense.”107 Professor Uphoff similarly found that “Missouri public
defenders are handling too many cases leaving defenders insufficient time or
the resources to do all of the tasks needed to adequately defend their
clients.”108
Defendants moved to dismiss the class action, arguing that sovereign
immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims.109 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri denied the State’s motion to dismiss.110 The
court held that Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants were not barred by
sovereign immunity because, under Missouri law, the state has no immunity
from claims seeking equitable relief and because then-Governor Greitens –
being responsible for the enforcement of Missouri laws – had a sufficient
connection to the challenged conduct.111
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed,
however.112 The Eighth Circuit stated that “sovereign immunity applies
101. Id. at 1007–08.
102. Id. at 1002, 1004–07.
103. Id. at 1004.
104. Id. at 1002–07.
105. Id.
106. Robert Boruchowitz worked as a public defender in Washington for over
thirty years and has written extensively on public defender standards and restructuring
public defender systems. Expert Report of Robert C. Boruchowitz at sec. III, Church,
268 F. Supp. 3d (No. 17-04057-CV-C-NKL), 2017 WL 9857221. Rodney Uphoff is
an Emeritus Professor at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Uphoff,
supra note 28, at 1. He has written numerous articles on criminal defense, indigent
defense services, and ethical issues facing those working in the criminal justice
system. Id.
107. Boruchowitz, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 5, 7.
108. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 24–25.
109. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1009.
110. Id. at 996.
111. Id. at 1011–13.
112. Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 2019).
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unless it is waived or a statutory or recognized common law exception, such
as consent, is applicable.”113 Finding no waiver or common law exception in
its de novo review, the Eighth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity
barred Plaintiffs’ claims.114 Neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit
addressed Plaintiffs’ allegations of constitutional violations.115

B. Bail Reform in the United States
The United States Supreme Court recognized in the early twentieth
century that bail is “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings.”116
Church v. Missouri briefly touched on the issue of bail, which is currently
receiving national reformation.117 In Church, all Plaintiffs were held on bail
but could not afford to pay.118 Plaintiffs did not have counsel present when
bail was set.119 This is typical for Missouri’s indigent defendants, though
studies have proven that representation at initial hearings significantly
increases the number of defendants released on their own recognizance.120
Moreover, two-and-a-half times as many represented defendants had their bail
reduced to an affordable amount as compared to unrepresented defendants.121
In states where many defendants initially appear before the court without
an attorney present, as in Church, the court generally sets bail at a
predetermined amount, which is based upon the charged offense instead of an
assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay.122 If bail is set, a bail bondsman
will charge the defendant a fee to post bond for the defendant.123 Once the
case is dissolved, the court returns the money to the bondsmen, resulting in a
profit to the bondsman.124 If the defendant is unable to pay for bail himself or
pay the bondsman’s fee, the court detains the defendant until bond is posted,
modified to an amount that the defendant can pay, or the case concludes.125
This bail process leads to excessive detention because detainment is
based on a defendant’s ability to pay bail.126 Many defendants are detained
not because they are a flight risk or a threat to society but because they are
113. Id. at 743.
114. Id. at 745–46.
115. See generally id.
116. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
117. See Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d
913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019).
118. Id. at 1002, 1004–07.
119. Id.
120. See Colbert, supra note 21, at 1720.
121. Id.
122. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2018).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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unable to post bail.127 Nearly two-thirds of jailed persons in the United States
have not been convicted but are in jail because they cannot afford bail.128 As
many of these defendants qualify as indigent, their cases are sent to state
public defender offices, adding to the already overwhelming caseloads.129
Some states, like New Jersey, have turned to bail reform to decrease the
number of defendants incarcerated after bail hearings.130 Implemented in
2017, New Jersey’s bail reform aimed to replace judicial discretion regarding
pretrial detention with an objective, scientific assessment based on empirical
data and risk factors.131 The empirical data is largely supplied by criminal
justice statistics.132 The reform created a Pretrial Services Program, a unit
within the criminal division of the New Jersey Judiciary tasked with preparing
automated risk assessments, called Public Safety Assessments (“PSA”),
which recommend conditions of release for each criminal defendant.133 PSAs
utilize nine risk factors that measure a defendant’s risk of failure to appear
and risk of committing new criminal activity before trial.134 These factors
include: age at current arrest; current violent offense; pending charge at the
time of the offense; prior misdemeanor convictions; prior felony convictions;
prior violent convictions; prior failure to appear pretrial in the past two years;
prior failure to appear pretrial older than two years; and prior sentence to
incarceration.135
Each of the nine factors adds points to a defendant’s raw score.136 For
example, if a defendant failed to appear pretrial within the last two years, a

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
See id. at 1127.
Id. at 1130.
Id.; John Gregory, Prospects for Bail Reform in Kentucky, PBS: KY. EDUC.
TELEVISION (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.ket.org/public-affairs/prospectsbail-reform-kentucky/ [perma.cc/G2K6-HXE8]; Rebeca Ibarra, New Jersey’s Bail
Reform Law Gets Court Victory, WNYC NEWS (Jul. 9, 2018),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/new-jerseys-bail-reform-law-gets-court-victory/
[perma.cc/DJ9T-QVFH]; Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End Cash
Bail After 40-Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-endcash-bail [perma.cc/DAM3-732P].
131. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1130; see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (2017).
132. Youngjin Choi, Lessons from California and New Jersey Bail Reform
Legislation,
NY
L.
J.
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/lessons-from-california-andnew-jersey-bail-reform-legislation/?slreturn=20190230131957
[perma.cc/P3VFLKES].
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (2017).
134. Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions – December
2018, 1–4, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?c=R6P
[perma.cc/438C-CYH8].
135. Id.
136. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131.
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point would be added to his risk assessment score.137 A defendant’s points
are totaled into a raw score.138 The raw score is then converted to a six-point
scale, with one being low risk and six being high risk.139 These nine factors
are weighed to compute three prediction scores: a failure to appear score, a
risk of new criminal activity score, and a risk of new violent criminal activity
score.140 These scores are then reported to the court.141 Judges reference the
PSA report at bail hearings to determine whether to set bail, release the
defendant on his or her own recognizance, or detain the defendant.142
New Jersey’s PSA proved popular, and other states began implementing
similar bail reforms.143 Risk assessments are used in approximately forty
jurisdictions, including Alaska and California.144 California adopted an
algorithmic system similar to New Jersey’s model, and its system
categorically prohibits pretrial release for certain classes of crimes, such as
violent felonies and felonies involving a deadly weapon.145 Additionally,
California’s bail reform entirely eliminated cash bail.146 Instead, a court will
release a defendant on his or her own recognizance with nonmonetary
conditions “that will reasonably assure the public safety and the person’s
return to court” or the defendant will be detained.147 The outcome depends in
part on the defendant’s raw score from the risk assessment.148
Many of these bail reform systems also create a presumption of detention
for certain classes of offenses.149 In 2020, California will vote on an
additional proposal to the state’s reformed system that, will create a
presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial
supervision will reasonably assure [public safety] pending arraignment” if the
crime charged is a violent felony, the arrested person was on a form of
postconviction supervision or threatened a witness, or the arrested person has
violated a condition of pretrial release.150 Such instances may lead to firsttime offenders being incarcerated pretrial or may compel a defendant to plead
guilty in return for immediate release.151

137. Public Safety Assessment, supra note 134, at 1–4.
138. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131.
139. Id.
140. Public Safety Assessment, supra note 134, at 1–4.
141. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131.
142. Id.
143. See Romo, supra note 130, at 2.
144. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (West
2019); see also Stevenson, supra note 1, at 307, 342.
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (West 2019).
146. § 1320.10(d).
147. § 1320.10(c).
148. § 1320.10.
149. § 1320.10(c).
150. § 1320.13.
151. Choi, supra note 132, at 3–4.
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The structure of the risk assessment tool varies by jurisdiction.152 For
example, Alaska developed two scales to convert a defendant’s risk
assessment score, unlike New Jersey which uses one scale to produce three
separate scores.153 One of the scales produces a risk score for failure to appear
and the other provides a risk score for new criminal arrest.154 Alaska’s Pretrial
Enforcement Division, tasked with performing pretrial risk assessments, then
uses the highest score of the two scales when making its recommendations to
the court.155 Within states like Colorado, Missouri, and Texas who have yet
to officially pass a bail reform, courts will be required to create and implement
risk assessment tools as well as determine which factors its assessment will
consider.156
This bail reform movement is similar to federal efforts to reform
sentencing guidelines in the late twentieth century.157 Prior to reform, federal
judges had great discretion in sentencing, which resulted in sentencing that
widely varied across jurisdictions.158 Congress subsequently passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, establishing the Sentencing Commission.159
The Sentencing Commission formulated sentencing guidelines that were
“intended to limit sentencing disparities and to ensure that sentences would
‘adhere to a consistent sentencing philosophy.’”160 Under the new guidelines,
judges would score the characteristics of the offense and the offender based
on a rubric that would then relay a sentencing range.161
This federal sentencing reformation largely failed.162 Soon after the
guidelines were established, Congress began to override the goals of the
guidelines by imposing congressionally mandated minimum sentences and
sentencing ranges.163 These sentencing schemes forced judges to impose
overly lengthy sentences on defendants who they would otherwise have given

152. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010 (2018); H.B. No. 19-1226, 72d Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019); H.B. 94, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); H.B.
1323, 86th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019).
153. See Pamela Cravez, Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Developed for Alaska,
UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE JUST. CTR., https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/co
llege-of-health/departments/justice-center/alaska-justice-forum/34/3winter2018/a.pre
trial-risk-assessment.cshtml [perma.cc/ZHW8-2K3S] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. H.B. No. 19-1226, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019); H.B. 666,
100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); H.B. 1323, 85th Legis., Reg. Sess.
(Tx. 2019).
157. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1134.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 59 (1983)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12

312

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

a shorter sentence or placed on probation.164 Additionally, reduced judicial
discretion led judges to increase reliance on prosecutorial
recommendations.165 As a result of their increased influence, prosecutors
often recommended to judges that a given defendant be incarcerated pending
trial, leading to an influx in federal jail populations.166 Consequently, the
Sentencing Reform Act makes it easier for prosecutors and judges to detain
defendants who are presumed innocent for weeks or months as their cases
pend.167 This remains the case today.168

C. Bail Reform in Missouri
In January 2019, Missouri joined the reform bandwagon when Missouri
Supreme Court then-Chief Justice Zel Fischer announced new court rules.169
During his State of the Judiciary speech, Chief Justice Fischer outlined the
major changes the new rules will bring, including restructuring the courts’
approach to ordering release or detainment.170 Highlighting the motivation
for these changes, Chief Justice Fischer noted the number of people who
cannot afford bail and who, as a result, “lose their jobs, cannot support their
families, and are more likely to reoffend.”171 Chief Justice Fischer
commented that the judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that accused
persons are treated fairly under the law without regard to their ability to pay.172
The new rules, which became effective on July 1, 2019, modify Missouri
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 21, 22, and 33.173 These changes adjust
how courts determine whether to detain an arrested person or to grant
conditional release.174 When a defendant is arrested under a warrant, he must
appear before a judge within forty-eight hours of confinement for this
determination to be made.175 For a defendant charged with a bailable offense,
164. See id. at 1136.
165. Id. at 1135.
166. Id. at 1137.
167. Id.
168. Although the federal government has taken steps to reform the federal
criminal justice system, these efforts, specifically the FIRST STEP Act signed by
President Donald Trump in 2018, generally do not affect arraignment proceedings or
defendants who are incarcerated pretrial. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat 55194, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/5682/text [perma.cc/V34U-LSR6].
169. Hon. Zel M. Fischer, State of the Judiciary, Jefferson City, January 2019,
MO. COURTS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=136253.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Order Dated December 18, 2018, Re: Rules 21, 22, and 33, MO. COURTS §
21.09 (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=134633.
174. Fisher, supra note 169.
175. Order Dated December 18, 2018, Re: Rules 21, 22, and 33, supra note 173,
at § 21.09.
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the court must first consider nonmonetary conditions of release, seeking “the
least restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release.”176 In
doing so, the court must evaluate the likelihood of the defendant reappearing
at trial or other stages of the proceedings and the safety of the community,
victims, and witnesses.177 If the court determines that nonmonetary
conditions will not secure the defendant’s appearance or provide protection,
the court may then consider monetary conditions or a combination of
monetary and nonmonetary conditions.178
When imposing monetary conditions, the court must evaluate the
defendant’s ability to pay and cannot impose a higher payment than necessary
to ensure the defendant appears at trial or the community’s safety.179 Only
upon a determination by clear and convincing evidence may a court detain a
defendant pretrial.180 Whether the defendant should be released or detained
is determined on a case-by-case basis.181
Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s lead, Missouri’s General
Assembly introduced a bill that would codify these new court rules. Titled
the Money Bail Reform Act of 2019 (the “MBRA”), the Act was introduced
in the Missouri House of Representatives in January 2019.182 As of the time
of the writing of this Note, the MBRA had been referred to the Crime
Prevention and Public Safety Committee in the House of Representatives,
where the bill subsequently died.183 The MBRA was modeled after bail
reforms in other jurisdictions, where public defenders and civil rights groups
are now attacking the effectiveness of those bail. The next Section discusses
the criticisms of bail reform and potential issues with Missouri’s bail reform
movement.

IV. DISCUSSION
Public defenders across the United States are criticizing the bail reform
movement.184 In Virginia, public defenders argue the new bail reform is

176. Id. at § 33.01(c).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at § 33.01(d).
181. Id. at § 33.01(e).
182. H.B. 666, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). This bill would
have enacted provisions under Chapter 544 of Missouri’s Criminal Procedure statutes
pertaining to arrest, examination, commitment and bail. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Alice Cherem & Carly Taylor, Bail Reform Hasn’t Led to Fewer
Held in Jail, Court Records Show, MD. REPORTER (Jan. 1, 2019)
https://marylandreporter.com/2019/01/01/bail-reform-hasnt-led-to-fewer-held-injail-court-records-show/ [perma.cc/2PXZ-QNF6].; Choi, supra note 132; Alex Koma,
Public Defenders Blast Arlington Prosecutor’s Cash Bail Reforms as ‘Misleading’
and
Ineffective,
ARL
NOW
(Nov.
15,
2018,
3:45
PM),
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ineffective and merely pledges to follow the law that is already in place,
particularly the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive bail.185 In
California, public defenders pulled their support before the state’s bail reform
bill passed, reasoning that the bill gave too much power to judges and relied
too heavily on the risk assessment tool.186 Additionally, the American Civil
Liberties Union and other civil rights organizations criticized the algorithms
as inherently flawed because “they perpetuate racial disparities within the
criminal justice system.”187
In addition to heavy criticism from both public defenders and civil rights
groups, bail reform does little to protect indigent defendants’ right to effective
counsel because the reform does not reduce public defenders’ caseloads or
increase funding. This Part first addresses the effects and criticisms of bail
reform, then discusses methods to improve the bail system in Missouri.

A. The Effects of Bail Reform
The ultimate goal of bail reform is to reduce pretrial incarceration
rates.188 Bail reform seeks to align this goal with ensuring pretrial justice and
preserving the presumption of innocence.189 But like the federal Sentencing
Reform Act, bail reform has thus far been heavily criticized for not producing
these expected outcomes.190
For instance, Maryland is experiencing the opposite effects as those
intended by its bail reform.191 Though the use of cash bail has decreased in
the state, a 2018 study found that Maryland judges have replaced cash bail
with “no bail” detainment instead.192 The percentage of defendants held with
https://www.arlnow.com/2018/11/15/public-defenders-blast-arlington-prosecutorscash-bail-reforms-as-misleading-and-ineffective/ [perma.cc/NM6L-HL4M].
185. Koma, supra note 184. The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
186. Abbie Vansickle, So Much for the Great California Bail Celebration, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/30
/so-much-for-the-great-california-bail-celebration [perma.cc/ENM4-Z7LL].
187. Madeleine Carlisle, The Bail-Reform Tool That Activists Want Abolished,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/0
9/the-bail-reform-tool-that-activists-want-abolished/570913/
[perma.cc/L2ZASBL4].
188. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1144.
189. Id.
190. See Christopher Zoukis, Maryland Bail Reform Backfires, Drives Up Number
of
Inmates,
ZOUKIS
PRISONER
HANDBOOK
(Jul.
19,
2018),
https://www.prisonerresource.com/prison-reform/maryland-bail-reform-backfiresdrives-up-number-of-inmates/ [perma.cc/U5RC-F8LP].
191. Id.
192. Cherem & Taylor, supra note 184; Prince George’s County: A Study of Bail,
COLOR
OF
CHANGE
&
PROGRESSIVE
MD.
3
(Jul.
2018),
https://static.colorofchange.org/static/v3/pg_report.pdf?akid=14740.3112990.hZo0e
M&rd=1&t=8 [perma.cc/99XB-9HXU].
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no bail increased by over fourteen percent, whereas the percentage of
defendants released with no bail increased by only two percent.193 Moreover,
the study found that the jail population remained the same after the reform
took effect.194
A similar result was found in Kentucky.195 There, a study on judicial
tendencies after bail reform was passed concluded that “[i]f judges followed
the recommendations associated with the risk assessment, ninety percent of
defendants would be granted immediate non-financial release. In practice,
only twenty-nine percent are released on non-monetary bond at the first bailsetting.”196 The results in Kentucky show that the judicial discretion impedes
the effectiveness of bail reform.197 In California, many civil rights
organizations pulled their support from the state’s bail reform bill because of
the great breadth of discretion the bill provided judges.198
Bail reform is criticized for being institutionally biased as well.199 Risk
assessments base their algorithms on data largely provided by criminal justice
statistics.200
This data contains race, gender, and socio-economic
disparities.201 Because risk assessments are based on data “influenced by
structural racism,” they produce results that are therefore discriminatory.202
This may cause certain classes of individuals to be incarcerated pretrial for
low-level offenses where such individuals would not have been detained
before bail reform.203 In California, over one hundred organizations, in
withdrawing support from the bail reform bill, signed a statement saying that
“automated predictions based on such data – although they may seem
objective or neutral – threaten to further intensify unwarranted discrepancies
in the justice system and to provide a misleading and undeserved imprimatur
of impartiality for an institution that desperately needs fundamental
change.”204
With these criticisms in mind, Missouri should consider educating
judges on the dangers of no bail provisions. Alternatively, Missouri could
direct judges, through either Chief Justice George W. Draper III or the General

193. Prince George’s County, supra note 192, at 11.
194. Id. at 9.
195. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 362–63.
196. Id. at 310–11.
197. Id. at 311.
198. See Vansickle, supra note 186.
199. Id.; Choi, supra note 132.
200. Choi, supra note 132; Vansickle, supra note 186.
201. Carlisle, supra note 187; Essie Justice Group Withdraws Support for SB 10,
ESSIE JUST. GRP. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/essie-justicegroup-withdraws-support-for-sb-10/ [perma.cc/6UPC-BLGH].
202. Carlisle, supra note 187; Choi, supra note 132.
203. Choi, supra note 132; The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments: A
Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminaljustice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [perma.cc/2WKP-KLA6].
204. The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments, supra note 203.
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Assembly, to approach bail hearings with the presumption of release without
monetary conditions unless there is clear evidence of risk of flight or danger
to public safety. As seen in Kentucky and Maryland, when judges are
presented with the option of releasing defendants without bail, granting
conditional release, or detaining defendants without bail, judges are more
likely to detain without bail, which is the opposite of the MBRA’s goals.205
Creating a presumption of release without bail rather than a presumption of
detainment, as California did for certain offenses, 206 would better serve the
goals of bail reform. Prosecutors would then be required to overcome this
presumption, which would preserve a defendant’s presumption of innocence,
encourage equality in pretrial litigation, and reduce the number of persons
detained after initial appearances.

B. Missouri’s Money Bail Reform Act and the MSPD
The MSPD is currently suffering from gross underfunding and
debilitating caseloads.207 The new court rules will not significantly alleviate
these problems or change the quality of representation a public defender can
provide to an indigent defendant. The struggles the MSPD experiences do not
change when a defendant is granted conditional release or released on his or
her own recognizance.208
Arguably, bail reform may have some positive effects on the adequacy
of representation public defenders could provide. Reform may increase and
improve communication between a defendant and his public defender because
defendants can access more forms of communication outside of jail.
Defendants released conditionally or without bail may also be able to aid their
public defender in obtaining critical evidence and locating witnesses.
Although this may be helpful, public defenders, burdened with hundreds of
cases and the stress of being under-resourced, lack the time necessary to
conduct thorough investigations, perform motion practice, and research to
prepare a defense.209 The new court rules do little to remedy the fact that
indigent defendants are not being afforded their right to effective counsel.
A defendant who is no longer required to pay bail may be able to afford
a private attorney or at least the attorney’s retention fee.210 If defendants hire
private attorneys, the number of cases assigned to public defenders should
decrease. When the costs of discovery, motion practice, and investigation are
factored in, however, the total cost of private representation is much higher

205. Prince George’s County, supra note 192; Stevenson, supra note 1, at 354–
57.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See infra Part II.B.
Id.
Id.
Uphoff, supra note 28, at 23.
Uphoff, Foreword, supra note 30, at 669.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/12

20

Kramer: Bail Reform

2020]

BAIL REFORM

317

than an initial retention fee or a bail amount.211 Many low-income defendants
cannot afford the total cost of hiring a private attorney.212 Although, in theory,
defendants released on bail have more of an opportunity to hire a private
attorney, in practice few will be able to do so. Consequently, the reform is
likely to have little effect on the overwhelming caseloads of the MSPD.
But there are ways to improve Missouri’s bail system so that public
defenders can provide effective counsel to indigent defendants. One method
is to require indigent defendants to be represented by public defenders at
initial appearances.213 Currently in Missouri, as depicted in Church, public
defenders are not required to appear at arraignment. 214 Rather, a defendant
may make a showing of indigency at the initial appearance, and only upon a
determination of indigency will the court then appoint counsel to the
defendant.215 Without defense counsel present to advocate for a defendant,
judges rely on prosecutorial recommendations, their own experience, and the
nature of the crime charged when determining bail.216 While Missouri’s bail
reform facially eradicates this custom, in practice the effect may not be as
comprehensive as intended because the new court rules defer to a court’s
judgment when determining bail. The rules merely provide more factors to
consider during arraignment. As a result, a defendant in Missouri may
continue to wait in jail for weeks or months after his or her initial appearance
before being appointed a public defender.217
Many arrested persons face low-level misdemeanor charges, which are
offenses that generally should not require bail or detainment and which,
according to Argersinger, entitle the defendant to representation.218 Requiring
representation at bail hearings forces the court’s focus to the front end of the
criminal process, increasing the likelihood that these low-level cases will be
dismissed and discouraging prosecution of such minor offenses.219 In cases
that continue past initial appearances, indigent defendants are less likely to be
detained or have bail set when provided representation at the bail setting

211. Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 744 (2006); see also Uphoff, Foreword, supra note 30, at 669.
(2010) (“Generally, the marginally poor who face criminal charges either represent
themselves or scrape up just enough money to hire private counsel to negotiate a plea
bargain.”).
212. Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 211, at 744.
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stage.220 Public defenders and their ability to argue on behalf of indigent
defendants regarding bail are therefore imperative to protecting indigent
defendant’s pretrial procedural rights.
In order to have public defenders present at initial appearances,
Missouri’s General Assembly must increase funding to the MSPD. Properly
funding the MSPD would allow the system to hire more attorneys. Greater
manpower would increase the amount of time a public defender can spend on
a case. At the moment, Missouri public defenders are forced to pick which
cases to allocate their attention.221 The result is that misdemeanors and lesser
felonies – the cases that would benefit the most from representation at bail
hearings – generally go uninvestigated.222 Much of the investigation for these
cases happens right before trial, which decreases the likelihood that critical
evidence and witnesses will be found.223 Additionally, public defenders do
not have time for aggressive motion practice or legal research, and excessive
caseloads restrict the public defenders’ ability to litigate discovery issues.224
Increasing funding to allow for the hiring of more attorneys would fix this
problem. Public defenders would be able to properly investigate each case
and effectively represent clients in a manner that satisfies Gideon and its
progeny.
Additionally, increased funding and greater manpower would reduce the
number of cases appointed to each public defender. This, in turn, would afford
public defenders the time to represent indigent defendants at initial
appearances. Public defenders could then argue on behalf of indigent
defendants for a conditional release, a release on the defendant’s own
recognizance, or a reduced bail amount. For indigent defendants, having a
public defender argue for, and potentially obtain, these results could allow
defendants to keep their jobs, avoid eviction from their homes, and continue
to support their families, which, as then-Chief Justice Fischer pointed out, is
the goal of the new court rules and bail reform.225 The new court rules give
too much deference to judges and prosecutors without allowing defense
counsel the opportunity to advocate for their clients at arraignment, with the
likely result being that indigent defendants charged with low-level offenses
remain incarcerated due to failure to post bail.226

V. CONCLUSION
The new court rules have the potential to provide positive outcomes for
indigent defendants and the MSPD. However, Missouri should consider how
bail reform in other states have panned out and be wary of the benefits
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1720.
See Uphoff, supra note 28, at 23.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 24.
See Colbert et al., supra note 21, at 1720.
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promised by the reform that will actually be delivered. Missouri’s legislature
should instead focus on providing adequate funding to the MSPD. This will
enable public defenders to represent indigent defendants at initial
appearances, which will improve the quality of representation public
defenders can provide. Proper funding will additionally negate the need to
establish a new agency that the state government will have to fund. This, in
turn, will bring Missouri one step closer to improving the MSPD and
providing indigent defendants with their constitutionally protected Sixth
Amendment rights.
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